{"id":685,"date":"2013-05-01T16:24:01","date_gmt":"2013-05-01T16:24:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/?p=685"},"modified":"2018-03-18T01:18:52","modified_gmt":"2018-03-18T01:18:52","slug":"humphrey-h-pachecker-vs-the-florida-bar-u-s-supreme-court","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/2013\/05\/01\/humphrey-h-pachecker-vs-the-florida-bar-u-s-supreme-court\/","title":{"rendered":"Humphrey Humberto Pachecker -vs- The Florida Bar @ U.S. Supreme Court"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"banner\">\n<div id=\"supremecourt_seal\"><\/div>\n<div id=\"banner_right\">\n<div id=\"ctl00_ctl00_pnlspacer\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" id=\"ctl00_ctl00_imgclear\" src=\"http:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/images\/clearpixel.gif\" alt=\"spacer\" \/><\/div>\n<div id=\"searchbox\">\n<div><a href=\"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/05\/US-SUPREME-COURT.png\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-2164\"><img decoding=\"async\" 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Pachecker, Petitioner<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>v.<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>The Florida Bar<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p><figure id=\"attachment_1971\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-1971\" style=\"width: 660px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/04\/US-SUPREME-COURT.jpg\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-1971\"><img wpfc-lazyload-disable=\"true\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"wp-image-1971\" src=\"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/04\/US-SUPREME-COURT.jpg\" alt=\"FILE - This Jan. 25, 2012, file photo, shows the U.S. Supreme Court Building in Washington. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision to add immigration in early 2016 to its already robust list of politically charged cases means a raft of rulings in the late spring or early summer that could inject the court into the presidential campaign.(AP Photo\/J. Scott Applewhite, File)\" width=\"660\" height=\"426\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/04\/US-SUPREME-COURT.jpg 4000w, https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/04\/US-SUPREME-COURT-768x496.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 660px) 100vw, 660px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-1971\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">FILE &#8211; This Jan. 25, 2012, file photo, shows the U.S. Supreme Court Building in Washington. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision to add immigration in early 2016 to its already robust list of politically charged cases means a raft of rulings in the late spring or early summer that could inject the court into the presidential campaign.(AP Photo\/J. Scott Applewhite, File)<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Docketed:<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>March 12, 2013<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Lower Ct:<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Supreme Court of Florida<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<table border=\"0\" width=\"100%\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" align=\"center\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"20%\"><strong>\u00a0\u00a0Case Nos.:<\/strong><\/td>\n<td align=\"left\"><strong>(SC10-1896)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"20%\"><strong>\u00a0\u00a0Decision Date:<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>July 12, 2012<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"20%\">\u00a0\u00a0Rehearing Denied:<\/td>\n<td>December 11, 2012<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<table border=\"0\" width=\"100%\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"2\" align=\"center\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>~~~Date~~~<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>~~~~~~~Proceedings\u00a0 and \u00a0Orders~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td valign=\"top\"><strong>Mar 8 2013<\/strong><\/td>\n<td valign=\"top\"><strong>Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due April 11, 2013)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td valign=\"top\"><strong>Apr 24 2013<\/strong><\/td>\n<td valign=\"top\"><strong>DISTRIBUTED for Conference of May 9, 2013.<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>\u00a0May 13 2013\u00a0\u00a0 PETITION for Writ of certiorari is denied. June 03 2013\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Petitioner Humphrey H. Pachecker files his\u00a0Verified Statement within the Supreme Court of The United States and the Supreme Court of Florida.<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<table border=\"0\" width=\"873\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>~~Name~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/td>\n<td>~~~~~~~Address~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~<\/td>\n<td>~~Phone~~~<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Attorneys for Petitioner:<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Humphrey H.\u00a0Pachecker<\/td>\n<td>1621 Lakeview Drive<\/td>\n<td>(863) 414-1888<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><\/td>\n<td>Sebring,\u00a0FL\u00a0\u00a033870<\/td>\n<td><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td colspan=\"3\"><strong>Supreme Court of the United States &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/Search.aspx?FileName=\/docketfiles\/12-9192.htm\">https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/Search.aspx?FileName=\/docketfiles\/12-9192.htm<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Party name: Humphrey H. Pachecker<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>No.______<span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">12-9192<\/span>_____<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>IN THE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>_________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">Humphrey Humberto Pachecker\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Petitioner Pro Se<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">vs.<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">The Florida Bar Association\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Respondents, et al<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">_____________________________<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">CASE NO.: SC10-1896<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">Lower Tribunal No(s).:<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">20073084(10)<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">20073085(10)<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">20083103(10)<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">20103022(10)<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>Petitioner Humphrey Humberto Pachecker\u2019s Statement within the Supreme Court of The United States. <\/strong><strong>Verified Statement in Pro Se <\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\"><strong>________________________________________<\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">Humphrey Humberto Pachecker<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">1621 Lakeview Drive<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">Sebring, Florida33870<\/p>\n<p align=\"center\">(863) 414-1888<\/p>\n<p>State of Florida<\/p>\n<p>County of Highlands<\/p>\n<p>Before me this day personally appeared Humphrey Humberto Pachecker (\u201cHHP\u201d) who, being duly sworn deposes and says:<\/p>\n<p>A writ of certiorari (\u201cCert\/Petition\u201d) is a formal request for the United States Supreme Court (\u201cUSSC\u201d) to review a lower court\u2019s ruling.\u00a0 In this case, (\u2018my case\u201d) HHP\u2019s petition for write of certiorari filed on March 18, 2013 and placed on the docket on March 12, 2013, as Case Number- 12-9192, requesting review of a ruling from The Florida Supreme Court (\u201cFLASC\u201d) under case number SC10-1896, including lower tribunals, et al.<\/p>\n<p>This denial of HHP\u2019s\u00a0 Cert\/Petition by the USSC in the FLASC means its decision stands as a final decision.<\/p>\n<p>This does not mean that the USSC either agrees or disagrees with the decision of the FLASC, only that the case will no be reviewed.<\/p>\n<p>The USSC receives over Five Thousand (5000) Cert\/Petitions annually, of those cases, the USSC accept One Hundred (100). The USSC has the discretion to hear only cases they deem appropriate. Constitutionally, those involved in the lawsuit are each entitled to on appeal, which is handled at the district appeals court level which entitlement has not being apply in this case.<\/p>\n<p>The USSC denies must Cert\/Petitions because the court has no desire to change the interpretation of modern law.<\/p>\n<p>The USSC agrees to hear cases that are either novel issues or issues that the court believes require guidance when is not in agreement with the United States Constitution.<\/p>\n<p>American Law is based on the principles of precedent, meaning that if a court has already ruled on a given legal issue and another case, as is in my case, arises with the same legal issue, the holding in the previous case shall be applied to the new case, such as must have been in my case.<\/p>\n<p>The use of precedents helps to promote stability in our legal system, as all parties are given notice as to the current state of the law. Adhering to the use of precedent complies with the doctrine of stare decisis.<\/p>\n<p>Precedents also have a role to play when new legal issues are presented to courts. In my case there are no legal new issues, hence I did look to cases that have been decided in the past supporting my current arguments presented to the FLASC and later to the USSC.<\/p>\n<p>Only USSC precedents are binding on all courts. The USSC may decide to hear a case because a State Supreme Court, as it\u2019s in my case, has come to different conclusion on the same legal issued presented as is in my case.<\/p>\n<p>The following precedents illustrate my position in accord to our stare decisis court system.<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">In The Florida Bar v. Savitt,\u00a0 <\/span><\/strong>363 So.2d 559, the Supreme Court held that, [T]he firm [law office] and its members, associates or employees properly may conduct the following practice of law:\u2026 (e)give legal advice on the law of jurisdictions other than Florida to non-Florida clients in transaction with person residing in Florida or with\u00a0 business enterprises having their principal place of business in Florida; provided that matters of Florida law, if any, are handled by members of The Florida Bar and provided that, if the lawyer giving the legal advice is not a member of The Florida Bar, the lawyer is in Florida on a transitory basis:\u2026<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">In The Florida Bar v. Moses,\u00a0 <\/span><\/strong>380 So.2d 412, the Supreme Court held that,\u2026 [I]f an activity is the practice of law but the activity is authorized, the activity is not the unlicensed practice of law and may be engaged in by a nonlawyer.<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">In The Florida Bar v. Sperry,<\/span><\/strong> 140 So. 2d 587, 591; 373 U.S. 379, the Supreme Court found that setting forth broad definition of the practice of law was \u201cnigh onto impossible.\u201d\u00a0 Federal statutes authorize the federal commission and agency to prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, foreign attorneys, and other persons representing applicants before these federal agencies.<\/p>\n<p>One of these federal agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, regulation 8 C.F.R. ss 103.2(a)(3), states that there are three types of individuals authorized to file legal representation as representatives of applicants or petitioners.<\/p>\n<p>(1)\u00a0\u00a0 Attorneys in theUnited States, as defined at 8 C.F.R.ss 292.1(f).<\/p>\n<p>(2)\u00a0\u00a0 Foreign attorneys- outside of the United States, as defined at 8 C.F.R.ss 292.1(a)(6).<\/p>\n<p>(3)\u00a0\u00a0 Accredited representatives, as defined at 8 C.F.R. ss 292.1(a)(4)<\/p>\n<p>In my case, I am a foreign attorney with U.S. Law education\u2019s degrees in\u00a0 comparative law and U.S. Immigration law, Federal law of civil procedures, all obtained at local college and university, A.B.A. law school approved.<\/p>\n<p>In my case, I am an attorney former partner and firm supervision\/administrator of George Chernoff and Associates dba NAFA Attorneys, P.A., a New York attorney by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC, pursuant to an international and interstate partnership agreement following the principles set forth in the case, <strong>The Florida Bar v. Savitt<\/strong>, which dealt with a dispute between The Florida Bar and New York lawyers setting up an office in Florida in which the partner assigned to supervise was not admitted to the practice of law in Florida, as is in my case.<\/p>\n<p>In my case, is a case involving an interstate \u2013 international partnership of the type envisioned in ABA Comm, on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 316 (1967). One of the conclusions of that opinion was that: \u201cThe Canons of Ethics do not prohibit a lawyer in State I from entering into an arrangement with a lawyer in State II for the practice of law by which they share in the responsibility and liability of each other, if they indicate the limitations on their practice in a manner consistent with the canons. Subject to the same limitations, offices of the firm could be opened in both states. Of course, only the individuals permitted by the laws of their respective states to practice law here would be permitted to do the acts defined by the state as the practice of law in that state, but there are no ethical barriers to carrying on the practice by such a firm in each state so long as the particular person admitted in that state is the person who, on behalf of the firm, vouched for the work of all of the others and, with the client and in the courts, did the legal acts defined by that state as the practice of law.\u201d\u00a0 <strong>Cf. Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla.1978)<\/strong> (presenting a list of prohibited and permitted activities by members of an interstate \u2013 international partnership.<\/p>\n<p>The scope of my\u00a0 activity as a foreign attorney partner of George Chernoff, a member of the federal count in New York is adjacent to the problem presented in <strong>Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963)<\/strong>. Federal statutes authorize the Commission of Patents [BIA, Bureau of Immigration Appeal] to prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, foreign attorneys and other persons representing applicants before these federal offices. Sperry, who was a patent agent, recognized by the Commissioner of Patents, maintained an office in Tampa, Florida where he held himself out to be public as practicing patent law. The Supreme Court of Florida enjoined Sperry from engaging in the practice of law, including specific prohibitions against rendering legal opinions as to patentability and infringement, and against holding himself out as qualified to prepare and prosecute applications for letters patent.\u00a0\u00a0 Applying the Supremacy Clause the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the decree \u201csince it prohibits [Sperry] from performing tasks which are incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications before the Patent Office.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>In my case the issue defining the degrees of activity in Florida involving an international interstate partnership following the principles established in <strong>FLA BAR v Savitt<\/strong>, is if, which will constitute the unauthorized practice of law in Florida by me, a foreign attorney non-admitted in Florida who did maintains a principal office for the practice of law in my jurisdiction of admission in addition to others branches in Florida and in New York compare <strong>Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), Cert\/Petition denied, 385 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct<\/strong>. <strong>597, 17 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966) (in banc)<\/strong> (client liable for fees for out of court services rendered over five years period by attorney admitted in California in connection with antitrust case pending in federal court in New York where, if application had been made, California attorney would have been admitted pro hac vice.<\/p>\n<p>The scope of my activity as partner of George Chernoff New Yorkattorney is analogous to the issue presented in <strong><span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">Sperry v. Florida,<\/span><\/strong><strong> 373 U.S. 379.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The FLASC has ruled, in my case, against its own previous decisions, not only regarding the unauthorized practice of law, status of limitation, discovery procedures and civil procedures, but to my international interstate partnership agreement with a New York attorney.<\/p>\n<p>The scope of my activity as a member of a foreign bar submits that the FLASC injunction fails to recognize and excluded from its prohibitions my right to practice federal and non-Florida law. My contention has two aspects, the first prong of the argument rests on George Chernoff\u2019s status as a member of the bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC. That court, of course, controls whom it will recognize as members of its bar; it is not a matter within the direct control of FLASC or any state court. The decree in my case is not to be interpreted to prohibiting me from appearing before the U.S. Federal Agency for the State of Florida any more than it could be interpreted to prohibit my appearing before the foreign Tribunal of Appeals where I am also admitted. My right to practice before the local federal agencies is not limited to physical presence before the federal court\u2019s judges, magistrates, and BIA Officials [Board of Immigration Appeals].<\/p>\n<p>Respectfully submitted,<\/p>\n<p><em><strong>Humphrey Humberto Pachecker<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n<p>Petitioner Pro Se<\/p>\n<p>1621 Lakeview Drive<\/p>\n<p>Sebring,Florida33870<\/p>\n<p>863-414-1888<\/p>\n<p><strong>PROOF OF SERVICE<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>I, Humphrey Humberto Pachecker, do swear or declare that on this dateMay 24,2013,\u00a0 I have served this Verified Statement in Pro Se byUSregular mail to: The names and addresses of those served as are as follows:<\/p>\n<p>Ghunise L. Coaxum<\/p>\n<p>Bar Counsel,<\/p>\n<p>The Florida Bar<\/p>\n<p>TheGatewayCenter<\/p>\n<p>1000 Legion Place, Ste. 1625<\/p>\n<p>Orlando,FL32801-5200<\/p>\n<p>C\/O<\/p>\n<p>John F. Harkness Jr.<\/p>\n<p>Executive Director<\/p>\n<p>651 E. Jefferson Street<\/p>\n<p>Tallahassee,FL32399-2300<\/p>\n<p>******<\/p>\n<p>Johnette Hardiman, Chair<\/p>\n<p>Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law<\/p>\n<p>651 E. Jefferson Street<\/p>\n<p>Tallahassee,FL32399-2300<\/p>\n<p>******<\/p>\n<p>Lori S. Holcomb<\/p>\n<p>Unlicensed Practice of Law Counsel<\/p>\n<p>The Florida Bar<\/p>\n<p>651 E. Jefferson Street<\/p>\n<p>Tallahassee,FL32399-2300<\/p>\n<p>Sworn and declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct statement. Before me this 24<sup>th<\/sup> day of May, 2013, by HUMPHREY H PACHECKER who is personally known to me.<\/p>\n<p>HUMPHREY H PACHECKER<\/p>\n<p>SEAL &#8212; \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 NOTARY PUBLIC<\/p>\n<p><strong>Current<\/strong><strong> court\u2019s decision seconding the conviction on my position:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>FLASC did violate my Due process rights,<\/strong> that is, the legal requirement that the state must respect all of the legal rights that are owed to a person. Typically, &#8220;Due process&#8221; means 1) Notice, generally written, but some courts have determined, in rare circumstances, other types of notice suffice. Notice should provide sufficient detail to fully inform the individual of the decision or activity that will have an effect on his\/her rights or property or person. 2) Right to <em>grieve<\/em> (that being the right to complain or to disagree with the governmental actor\/entity that has decision making authority) and 3) the right to appeal if not satisfied with the outcome of the grievance procedure. Due process balances the power of law of the land and protects the individual person from it. When a government harms a person without following the exact course of the law, this constitutes a due-process violation, which offends against the rule of law.\u00a0 The following is a recent ruling supporting my position stated herein, that the scope of my activity as a member of a foreign bar submits that the FLASC injunction fails to recognize and exclude from its prohibitions my right to practice federal and non-Florida law. My contention has two aspects, the first prong of the argument rests on George Chernoff\u2019s status as a member of the bar of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial Department, and the USSC, That court, of course, controls whom it will recognize as members of its bar; it is not a matter within the direct control of FLASC or any state court. The decree in my case is not to be interpreted to prohibiting me from appearing before the U.S. Federal Agency for the State ofFloridaany more than it could be interpreted to prohibit my appearing before the foreign Tribunal of Appeals where I am also admitted. My right to practice before the local federal agencies is not limited to physical presence before the federal court\u2019s judges, magistrates, and BIA Officials [Board of Immigration Appeals].<\/p>\n<p><strong>Saturday, December 20, 2014<\/strong><\/p>\n<h3><a href=\"http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/legal_profession\/2014\/12\/the-utah-supreme-court-has-reversed-findings-of-misconduct-concluding-that-the-accused-attorney-had-been-denied-due-process.html\">Attorney Has Due Process Right To Notice Of Alleged Rule Violations <\/a><\/h3>\n<p>By <a href=\"http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/legal_profession\/2014\/12\/the-utah-supreme-court-has-reversed-findings-of-misconduct-concluding-that-the-accused-attorney-had-been-denied-due-process.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2FmiFL+%28Legal+Profession+Blog%29\">Legal Profession Prof<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/lawprofessors.typepad.com\/legal_profession\/2014\/12\/the-utah-supreme-court-has-reversed-findings-of-misconduct-concluding-that-the-accused-attorney-had-been-denied-due-process.html?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+typepad%2FmiFL+%28Legal+Profession+Blog%29\">Share<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The Utah Supreme Court has <a href=\"http:\/\/www.utcourts.gov\/opinions\/supopin\/Johnson20141212.pdf\" target=\"_self\">reversed<\/a> findings of misconduct, concluding that the accused attorney had been denied due process.\u00a0 A screening panel found that the attorney violated Rules 1.2, 1.4 and 8.4(a).<\/p>\n<p>The attorney had not been placed on notice of the alleged Rule 1.2, which violated his due process rights. The court found insufficient evidence of the remaining violations, concluding that the conduct at issue was addressed in Rule 1.1 (competence) rather than Rule 1.4 (communication). The screening panel declined to find a Rule 1.1 violation.<\/p>\n<p>The court held that conduct covered by one rule cannot be sanctioned by reference to another rule. (Mike Frisch)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"columnbottom\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" id=\"ctl00_ctl00_mainbody_imagebottomcolumn2\" src=\"http:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/images\/clearpixel.gif\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<div>\n<p><strong><em>\u201cThe \u00a0Supreme Court in my case has ruled against its own previous decisions, not only regarding the unauthorized practice of law, status of limitation, discovery procedures and civil procedures, but to my international interstate partnership agreement with a New York attorney.\u201d<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The principle of <em>stare decisis<\/em> can be divided into two components. The first is the rule that a decision made by a superior court, or by the same court in an earlier decision, is binding precedent that the court itself and all its inferior courts are obligated to follow. The second is the principle that a court should not overturn its own precedent unless there is a strong reason to do so and should be guided by principles from lateral and inferior courts. The second principle, regarding persuasive precedent, is an advisory one that courts can and do ignore occasionally.<\/p>\n<p>The Supreme Court of California&#8217;s explanation of this principle is that, [u]nder the doctrine of <em>stare decisis<\/em>, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of <em>stare decisis<\/em> makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California. Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon all the superior courts of this state, and this is so whether or not the superior court is acting as a trial or appellate court. Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Scalia demonstrates how to recover from an apparent misstep with a &#8216;Scalia culpa,&#8217; says reporter:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>Justice Antonin Scalia relied on an often-used quotation last week when he admitted overlooking an issue in a prior case which led to the appearance of inconsistency.\u00a0 Scalia was called to task by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who said he apparently changed position when he argued in a dissent last week that the <\/em><em>U.S.<\/em><em> Supreme Court should have dismissed a case as improvidently granted. Scalia <a href=\"http:\/\/www.abajournal.com\/news\/article\/unusual_scotus_lineup_holds_evidentiary_support_not_required_with_class_act\">had argued<\/a> in the dissent that the real issue in the case was whether the federal appeals court abused its discretion in denying the defendant permission to appeal. As a result, he argued, the majority should not have decided a removal issue. Yet that problem did not deter him in an earlier case.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>In a <a href=\"http:\/\/nyti.ms\/1wei9qb\">Sidebar<\/a> column, New York Times SCOTUS correspondent Adam Liptak describes Scalia\u2019s recovery from the apparent flip-flop as a \u201cScalia culpa\u201d involving three steps.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>First, Liptak says, Scalia openly admitted the apparent change in position from an earlier case. Second, Scalia supported his acknowledgement with a \u201cclassy quotation\u201d from former Justice Robert H. Jackson. Third, he returned fire, noting Ginsburg had used the same quotation when she shifted positions.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>Scalia said the prior opinion was resolved without reference to the abuse of discretion question. \u201cAs for my own culpability in overlooking the issue,\u201d Scalia wrote, \u201cI must accept that and will take it with me to the grave. But its irrelevance to my vote in the present case has been well expressed by Justice Jackson, in a passage quoted by the author of today\u2019s opinion: \u2018I see no reason why I should be consciously wrong today because I was unconsciously wrong yesterday.\u2019 \u201d\u00a0\u00a0 University of Chicago law professor Justin Driver wrote in the Georgetown Law Journal in 2011 that the Jackson quote is one of three often used to explain a shift in a judge\u2019s thinking, Liptak notes.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>The others:<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>\u2022 From Justice Joseph Story in an 1827 opinion: \u201cMy own error \u2026 can furnish no ground for its being adopted by this court.\u201d\u00a0 \u2022 From Justice Felix Frankfurter in a 1949 dissent: \u201cWisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>The <\/strong><strong>Connecticut<\/strong><strong> Supreme Court<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jud.ct.gov\/external\/supapp\/Cases\/AROcr\/CR325\/325CR60.pdf\">\u00a0upheld<\/a>\u00a0as mandatory the six-year disciplinary statute of limitations for most violations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The issue that we must decide in this case is whether the six year limitation period set forth in Practice Book \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) constitutes a mandatory bar to grievance complaints brought after that six year limitation period has expired or whether the provision, instead, is discretionary. On <\/strong><strong>April 4, 2014<\/strong><strong>, Wesley S. Spears filed a grievance complaint against the defendant, Attorney Joseph Elder, alleging that the defendant had engaged in professional misconduct in 2004. A reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee conducted a hearing on the grievance complaint and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The reviewing committee also directed the plaintiff, the Disciplinary Counsel, to bring this presentment action against the defendant. After the plaintiff brought this action in 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the action was barred by \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E). The trial court concluded that the time limitation set forth in \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is not mandatory and denied the motion to dismiss. After a trial to the court, the trial court concluded that the defendant had violated certain of the Rules of Professional Conduct and ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. The defendant then filed this appeal. We conclude that \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) bars grievance complaints that are not brought within the six year limitation period unless one of the exceptions set forth in \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies. Because none of these exceptions applies in the present case, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to that court with direction to grant the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The story is a complicated one that led to this finding<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The presentment action was tried to the court, which concluded that the defendant had violated rules 4.1 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct by misrepresenting himself to a third person in the course of his representation of a client. As a sanction, the trial court ordered that the defendant be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The court<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>We conclude that the most reasonable interpretation of this rule is that the judges of the Superior Court intended that the six year period of limitation set forth in Practice Book \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) would bar any untimely complaints unless one of the exceptions set forth in subparagraph (i) or (ii) applies. We can think of no reason why our judges would expressly impose a specific period of limitation and then effectively eviscerate that limitation period by conferring unfettered discretion on the screening panel to ignore it&#8230;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Our determination that the time limitation set forth in Practice Book \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is mandatory finds support in the underlying purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is \u2018\u2018to preserve public confidence in the system and to protect the public and the court from unfit practitioners.\u2019\u2019 Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 234 <\/strong><strong>Conn.<\/strong><strong> 539, 554, 663 A.2d 317 (1995). The purpose is not to punish the attorney. E.g., Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 <\/strong><strong>Conn.<\/strong><strong> 668, 675, 646 A.2d 781 (1994). When an attorney has not engaged in any professional misconduct for six years prior to the date that a grievance complaint has been filed, and none of the exceptions set forth in \u00a7 2- 32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies, it reasonably may be presumed that the attorney does not pose a continuing danger to the public or the court. Our interpretation is also bolstered by the policies underlying limitation periods generally, \u2018\u2018namely, to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims and the impairment of proof wrought by lost witnesses and\/or evidence.\u2019\u2019 Flannery v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC, 312 Conn. 286, 309 n.23, 94 A.3d 553 (2014).<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Thus<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>In the present case, the sole reason that the trial court gave for denying the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was that the six year limitation period set forth in Practice Book \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is not mandatory. Because we have concluded that the limitation period is mandatory unless one of the exceptions set forth in \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (i) or (ii) applies, we conclude that the trial court improperly denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>The violations not subject to limitations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>\u2018\u2018Notwithstanding the period of limitation set forth in this subparagraph, an allegation of misconduct that would constitute a violation of Rule 1.15, 8.1 or 8.4 (2) through (6) of the Rules of Professional Conduct may still be considered as long as a written complaint is filed within one year of the discovery of such alleged misconduct.\u2019\u2019 Practice Book \u00a7 2-32 (a) (2) (E) (ii) provides: \u2018\u2018Each period of limitation in this subparagraph is tolled during any period in which: (1) the alleged misconduct remains undiscovered due to active concealment; (2) the alleged misconduct would constitute a violation of Rule 1.8 (c) and the conditions precedent of the instrument have not been satisfied;(3)the alleged misconduct is part of a continuing course of misconduct; or (4) the aggrieved party is under the age of majority, insane, or otherwise unable to file a complaint due to mental or physical incapacitation.\u2019\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Supreme Court of the United States &#8211; <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/Search.aspx?FileName=\/docketfiles\/12-9192.htm\">https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/Search.aspx?FileName=\/docketfiles\/12-9192.htm<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/DR-HHP.jpg\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-1100\"><img decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\" class=\"alignnone size-medium wp-image-1100\" src=\"http:\/\/nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/DR-HHP-263x300.jpg\" alt=\"DR HHP\" width=\"263\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/DR-HHP-263x300.jpg 263w, https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/08\/DR-HHP.jpg 269w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 263px) 100vw, 263px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Search: All Documents Docket Files For Search Term: Home\u00a0|\u00a0Search Results \u00a0Printer-Friendly Version Docket Oral Arguments Merits Briefs Bar Admissions Court Rules Case Handling Guides Opinions Orders and Journals About the Supreme Court Visiting the Court Public Information Jobs Links No. 12-9192 \u00a0Supreme Court of the United States &#8211; https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/Search.aspx?FileName=\/docketfiles\/12-9192.htm Title: Humphrey H. Pachecker, Petitioner v. &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/2013\/05\/01\/humphrey-h-pachecker-vs-the-florida-bar-u-s-supreme-court\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Humphrey Humberto Pachecker -vs- The Florida Bar @ U.S. Supreme Court&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"nf_dc_page":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-685","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/685","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=685"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/685\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=685"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=685"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.nafalaw.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=685"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}